**aff answers**

**2ac alt fails**

**Capitalism is not bounded by the exploitation of labor but extends itself through a productive imperative and the expropriation of land from the Native and the body of the slave. Their appeal to a transition state established by a worker’s party [insert their alternative] strengthens systems of state-based theft, racial accumulation and policing because the state requires these formations in order to function.**

**Wang 18** [Jackie, writer, poet, musician, and academic whose writing has been published by Lies Journal, HTML Giant, and BOMBlog, PhD African-American Studies @ Harvard, p. 112-25//AK47]

Racial Capitalism and Settler Colonialism Given the dual character of capitalist accumulation identified by both Rosa Luxemburg and David Harvey, what new understanding of capitalism would be generated by focusing on dispossession and expropriation over .work and production? Contemporary political theorists as well as critical ethnic studies, black studies, and Native studies scholars and activists analyze how racial slavery and seeder colonialism provide the material and territorial foundation for U.S. and Canadian sovereignty. Rather than casting slavery and Native genocide as temporally circumscribed events chat inaugurated the birth of capitalism in the New World ("primitive accumulation"), they show how the racial logics produced by these processes persist to this day: In order to recuperate the frame of political economy, a focus on the dialectic of racial slavery and settler colonialism leads to important revisions of Karl Marx's theory of primitive accumulation. In particular, Marx designates the transition from feudal to capitalist social relations as a violent process of primitive accumulation whereby "conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part." For Marx, chis results in the expropriation of the worker, the proletariat, who becomes the privileged subject of capitalist revolution. [f we consider primitive accumulation 35 a persistent structure rather than event, both Afro-pessimism and settler colonial studies destabilize normative conceptions of capitalism through the conceptual displacements of the proletariat. As Coulthard demonstrates, in considering Indigenous peoples in relation to primitive accumulation, "it appears that the history and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state." It is thus dispossession of land through genocidal elimination, relocation, and theft that animates Indigenous resistance and anticapitalism and "less around our emergent status 35 'rightless proletarians.'" If we extend the frame of primitive accumulation to the question of slavery, it is the dispossession of the slave's body rather than the proletarianization of labor that both precedes and exceeds the frame of settler colonial and global modernity. 13 As lyko Day notes, Native dispossession occurs through the expropriation of land, while black dis􀄅 possession is characterized by enslavement and bodily dispossession. Although both racial logics buttress white accumulation and are defined by a "genocidal limit concept" that constitutes these subjects as disposable, Day notes that "the racial content of Indigenous peoples is the mirror opposite of blackness. From the beginning, an eliminatory project was driven to reduce Native populations through genocidal wars and later through statistical elimination through blood quantum and assimilationist policies. For slaves, an opposite logic of exclusion was driven to increase, not eliminate, the population of slaves."14 A debate has ensued in critical ethnic studies about which axis of dispossession is capitalism's condition of possibility: the expropriation of Native land or chattel slavery? Was the U.S. made possible primarily by unbridled access to black labor, or through territorial conquest? Is the global racial order defined-as Day writes-primarily by the indigenous-settler binary or the black-nonblack binary? At stake in this debate is the question of which axis of dispossession is the "base" from which the "superstructures" of economy, national sovereignty, or even subjectivity itself emerge. Those who argue that settler colonialism is central have sometimes made the claim that even black Americans participate in settler colonialism and indigenous displacement by continuing to live on stolen land, while those who center slavery and antiblackness have sometimes viewed Native Americans as perpetrators of anriblackness insofar as some uibes have historically owned slaves and seek state recognition by making land-based claims to sovereignty-a claim that relies on a political grammar that black Americans do not have access to, as slaves were rem from their native lands when they were transported co the Americas (see Jared Sexton's "The Vel of Slavery"). Although weighing in on this debate is beyond rhe scope of this essay, I generally agree with Day's assertion that to treat this set of issues as a zero-sum game obfuscates the complexity of these processes. With that said, it is important to note that this book deals primarily with the antiblack dimensions of prisons, police, and racial capitalism, though I acknowledge that analyses of settler colonialism are equally vital to understanding the operations of racial capitalism and how race is produced through multiple expropriative logics. Gendered Expropriation Though this book focuses primarily on black racialization in a contemporary context, it is worth noting that expropriation reproduces multiple categories of difference--including the man-woman gender binary. Although categories of difference were not invented by capitalism, expropriative processes assign particular meanings to categories of difference. "Woman" is reproduced as inferior through the unwaged theft of her labor, while the esteem of the category of "man" is propped up by the valorization of his labor. Even when women are in the professional workforce, they are still vulnerable to expropriation when they are given or take on work beyond their formal duties-whether it's washing the dishes at the office, mentoring students, or doing thankless administrative work while male colleagues gee the "dysfunctional genius" pass. But above all, gendered expropriation occurs through the extraction of care labor, emotional labor, as well as domestic and reproductive labor all of which is enabled by the enforcement of a rigid gender binary. This system is propped up by gender socialization, which compels women to psychologically internalize a feeling of responsibility for others. Although, at a glance, ic might seem that the expropriation of women's labor happens primarily through housewifeitization, the marriage contract, and the assignment of child-care duties to women, in the current epoch-characterized by an aging baby boomer population and a shortage of geriatric health-care workers-women are increasingly filling this void by taking care of sick parents, family members, and loved ones. It is hardly surprising that two-thirds of those who care for chose with Alzheimer's disease are women, even as women are the primary victims of this disease. Given thac women's lives are often interrupted by both childcare duties and caring for ailing family members, it's also hardly surprising that women accumulate many fewer assets and arc more likely to retire into poverty than their male counterparts. A recent report found that the European Union gender pension gap was 40 percent, which far exceeds the gender pay gap of 16 percent. Overall, gender is a material relation that, among other things, bilks women of their futures. The aged woman who has toiled by caring for others is left with little by the end of her life. Though gender distinctions are maintained through expropriative processes, they also have consequences beyond the economic and material realm. While it could be said that disposability is the logic that corresponds to racialized expropriation, gendered subjectivation has as its corollary rapeability. It also goes without saying that these expropriative logics are not mutually exclusive, as nonwhite women and gender-nonconforming people may be subject to a different set of expropriative logics than white women. Racalized Expropriation Although I do not claim that expropriation should be defined exclusively as racialization (again, because different expropriative logics reproduce multiple categories of difference), this book deals primarily with the antiblack racial order that is produced by late-capitalist accumulation. Michael C. Dawson and Nancy Fraser are two contemporary political theorists who have defined expropriation as a racializing process in capitalist societies. In "Hidden in Plain Sight," Dawson takes Fraser to task for not acknowledging racialized expropriation as one of the "background domains" of capitalist society. Understanding the logic of expropriation, in his view, is necessary for understanding which modes of resistance are needed at this historical juncture. His article begins with a meditation on the question: Should activists and movements such as Black Lives Matter focus on racialized state violence (police shootings, mass incarceration, and so forth), or should they focus on racialized inequality cawed by expropriation and exploitation? What is the relationship between the first logic-characterized by disposability-and the second logic-characterized by exploitability and expropriability? Rather than describing these logics as distinct forms of antiblack racism, he analyzes them as two dimensions of a dynamic process whereby capitalist expropriation generates the racial order by fracturing the population into superior and inferior humans: Understanding the foundation of capitalism requires a consideration of "the hidden abode of race": the ontological distinction between superior and inferior humans-codified as race-that was necessary for slavery, colonialism, the theft of lands in the Americas, and genocide. This racial separation is manifested in the division between full humans who possess the right to sell their labor and compete within markets, and chose that are disposable, discriminated against, and ultimately either eliminated or superexploited.15 Black racialization, then, is the mark that renders subjects as suitable for-on the one hand-hyperexploitation and expropriation, and, on the other hand, annihilation. Before the neoliberal era, the racial order was propped up by the state, and racial distinctions were enforced through legal codification, Jim Crow segregation, and other formal arrangements. In a contemporary context, though the legal regime undergirding the racial order has been dismantled, race has maintained its dual character, which consists of "not only a probabilistic assignment of relative economic value but also an index of differential vulnerability to state violence." 16 In other words, vulnerability to hyperexploitation and expropriation in the economic domain and vulnerability to premature death in the political and social domains. My essay on the Ferguson Police Department and the city's program of municipal plunder is an attempt to make visible the hidden backdrop of Mike Brown's execution: the widespread racialized expropriation of black residents carried out by the criminal justice arm of the state. It is not just that Mike Brown's murder happened alongside the looting of residents at the behest of the police and the city's financial manager, but that racial legacies that have marked black residents as lootable are intimately tied to police officers' treatment of black people as killable. The two logics reinforce and are bound up with each other. In her response co Dawson's analysis of racialization as expropriation, Fraser develops Dawson's claims by looking at the interplay between economic expropriation and "politically enforced status distinctions." 17 Not only does accumulation in a capitalist society occur along the two axes of exploitation and expropriation, but one makes the other possible in that the "racialized subjection of those whom capital expropriates is a condition of possibility for the freedom of those whom it exploits." 18 In other words, the "front story" of free workers who are contracted by capitalists to sell their labor-power for a wage is enabled by, and depends on, expropriation that takes place outside this contractual arrangement.

Fraser further extends Dawson's analysis by offering a historical account of the various regimes of racialization. In her analysis of the "proletarianization" of black Americans as they migrated from the South to industrial centers in the North and Midwest during the flrst half of the twentieth century, she points out that even in the context of industrial "exploitation," the segmented labor market was organized such that a "confiscatory premium was placed on black labor." Black industrial workers were paid less than their white counterparts. In some sense, the racialized gap in earnings can be thought of as the portion that was expropriated from black workers. It is not as though the black laborers who joined the ranks of the industrial proletariat were newly subjected to exploitation rather than expropriation, but that these two methods of accumulation were operating in tandem. In the "present regime of racialized accumulation"- which she refers to as "financialized capitalism"-Fraser notes that there has been a loosening of the binary that has historically separated who should be subjected to expropriation from who should be subjected to exploitation, and that during the present period, debt is regularly deployed as a method of dispossession: Much large-scale industrial exploitation now occurs outside the historic core, in the BRICS countries of the semi-periphery. And expropriation has become ubiquitous, afflicting not only its traditional subjects but also those who were previously shielded by their status as citizenworkers. In these developments, debt plays a major role, as global financial institutions pressure states to collude with investors in extracting value from defenseless populations. 19 While I agree with Fraser's claim that the "sharp divide" berween "expropriab le subjects and exploitable citizen-workers" has been replaced by a "contin uum" (albeit a continuum chat remains racialized), I would add that the existence of poor whites who have fallen out of the middle class or have been affected by the opiate crisis at the present juncture represents not racial progress for black Americans, but the generalization of expropriability as a condition in the face of an accumulation crisis. In other words, immiseration for all rather than a growing respect for black Americans. Fraser rightly points out that "expropriation becomes tempting in periods of crisis."20 Sometimes the methods of accumulation that were once reserved exclusively for racialized subjects bleed over and are used on those with privileged status markings. If expropriation and exploitation now occur on a continuum, then it has been made possible, in part, by late capitalism's current modus operandi: the probabilistic ranking of subjects according to risk, sometimes indexed by a person's credit score. As I will demonstrate in the coming sections, this method is not a race-neutral way of gleaning information about a subject's personal integrity, credibility, or financial responsibility. It is merely an index of already-existing inequality and a way to distinguish between which people should be expropriated from and which should be merely exploited.

**2ac capitalism top level**

**All or nothing critique of capital relies on a flawed critique of reform-no root cause, no alt solvency-those arguments are based on essentialist assumptions**

**ROBBINS, PhD Harvard, 13**

(BRUCE, Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities, https://nplusonemag.com/issue-16/reviews/balibarism/)

BALIBAR’S NEW BOOKS will appear in an intellectual landscape where a **revolutionary Marxism** — at least from a glance at bookstores and syllabi — is still in vogue. Ambivalent as they are about revolution, what kind of reception will these books receive? Why do people read Marxist philosophers anyway? It would be hard to argue that the fashion for Marxism during the past decade or so has had anything to do with the perceived **proximity of revolution** or even the strength or militancy of working-class organizations. In the 1960s Marxist writers rode a wave of political energy and hope. That has mostly not been true for the generation that came of age around or after September 11, 2001, which saw inequality and unemployment rising but labor unions and left-wing parties falling. Interest in Marxism makes more sense as a response to the intensified financialization and globalization of capital, with its most revelatory moments in the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000–01 and more recently the 2008 financial crisis. It seems worth adding here that the digital revolution, which did for today’s generation something like what the Industrial Revolution did for Marx — prove that dramatic change was possible — helps explain some of the otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Hardt and Negri. As Balibar observes, their argument splits apart the Marxist concept of the material base, making much of (digital) technology, which has changed, but leaving out the relations of production, which have not, or at least not for the better. If you want to be a serious materialist, he says, you have to hold onto both. One consequence of capitalism’s ever-firmer annexation of the global scale and ever-tighter squeezing of the majority’s living standards has been that ordinary domestic politics, especially electoral politics, have come to feel ever more trivial and irrelevant. One need only look at voter turnout, even for elections like 2008, to see that abstention is the one principle in the US that enjoys broad consensus. Under these circumstances, even hard-won battles in the name of race, gender, and sexuality could come to seem a bit beside the point. To Žižek, who routinely gets laughs at the expense of multiculturalism, Balibar no doubt looks too eager to please the “identity” constituencies. To Balibar, Žižek and Badiou no doubt seem to have given up on the idea of **speaking to any constituencies —**that is, to have given up on the project of **politics.** Paradoxical as it may seem, giving up on politics has probably **been part of Marxism’s seductiveness for a long time**. No one in Balibar’s cohort (Balibar was born in 1942, Badiou in 1937, Rancière in 1940, Žižek in 1949) could have felt confident that as Marxists they came of age at a propitious time for plunging into the class struggle. If 1968 didn’t turn out to be the revolutionary conjuncture, no moment that has followed has come closer. In nonrevolutionary times, the most **tempting and pervasive of revisionisms** is to **give up on changing the world and just interpret it**. Nothing supplies serviceable analytic distance like the conviction that you don’t have a horse in this race. Witness the quietism of the New Left Review, the foremost organ of Marxism in the English-speaking world and yet a journal that you go to for searching analysis, not for uplifting news of movements and conflicts. For some years NLR, strongly influenced by Althusser, ostentatiously ignored thinkers in the messianic mode — and bless them for it. But isn’t there a sort of secret alliance between messianism and quietism? How can you stay so coolly detached unless you’re absolutely sure that in the end your day will come? Balibar wants no part of this alliance. His unwillingness to maintain an authoritative detachment from ongoing political struggles, however insignificant posterity may judge those struggles to be, is of a piece with his lack of certainty that he knows where History is going or who will lead it there. For some readers, this will be frustrating. His distaste for political theology, his premise that even in situations of political urgency there is no excuse for pretending that Marxism has all the answers, has doubtless driven away some who, whether aware of it or not, **preferred a system that did have all the answers** while also preferring prophets who carry those answers down from the mountain and deliver them in thunder. This seems the most likely reason why, as radical social transformation has reappeared as a historical possibility, as Marxism has reappeared to analyze its chances, and as Americans in search of political enlightenment continue to eavesdrop on exchanges among left-wing French philosophers, many of them Althusser’s former students, Balibar has had less of a hearing than the aging superstars around him. It is true that Balibar is personally mild, self-deprecating almost to a fault, and does not seek out occasions for newsworthy confrontation. David Rieff observes in a nasty but not inaccurate review of Claude Lanz-mann’s recent memoir that “self-deprecation has never been much prized in French intellectual life.” Things are not so different in the US. For whatever reasons, Balibar’s putative rivals have also largely avoided on-screen collisions with him. I note that Žižek calls Balibar out in two of his books, Revolution at the Gates and The Ticklish Subject — and then, seemingly forgetting he’s thrown down the gauntlet, devotes most of his pages to Badiou. Is Badiou an easier target? If so, what makes Balibar a harder one? Consider The Idea of Communism (2010), a collection of papers delivered with much fanfare at Birkbeck College in London in 2009, a year or so into the financial crisis, and coedited by the conference organizers, Žižek and Costas Douzinas. Balibar is not included in the collection (he was invited to the conference but was stuck teaching in California) and he is not cited in the index. His omission from the index is especially curious because he is in fact argued with, at least glancingly, in two places that I noticed: on the question, What is politics? and on the question, Should the left claim human rights? In both cases the underlying issue is whether it’s hopelessly naive to engage in politics at the level of the state. Balibar is taken, rightly, **as assuming that politics at the level of the state, rights, and law remains a significant obligation**. It’s clear that the other speakers disagree, but they **don’t feel obliged to spell out why.** Badiou’s contribution to The Idea of Communism openly rejects the enterprise of “ordinary” politics. (Much might be said about the assumption that passing previously unimaginable legislation like the forty-hour workweek or the graduated income tax or the regulation of the financial industry would count as “ordinary.”) Badiou takes as his premise that “ordinary history” is “confined within the State.” By contrast, the kind of history he thinks we need, the kind that is not confined within the State, is history that is faithful to “the Idea.” Badiou takes his argument about “the Idea” from Plato, whose usefulness to the left he seems recklessly eager to promote. But there is something post-Hellenic about the idea of an Idea that floats above ordinary history and beams encouragingly down on those, wherever and whenever they are, who are distressed by life on the ground. This might be what Balibar had in mind when he called Badiou a theologian. In the same volume Bruno Bosteels describes the disagreements among Badiou, Žižek, Rancière, and Balibar as the “fights of a dysfunctional family.” He doesn’t designate parents and children, but he admits that **Lenin had a point when he described the dogmatic antistatism of the holier-than-thou Communists to his left as indicative of “an infantile disorder.”** Rather than thinking of the family members as squabbling over who loves Marx most or who was Althusser’s favorite, it seems more generous to imagine them deciding whether to invest their nest egg in political ventures that may or may not pay off. Many of the issues that have filled the news over the past decades — ethnic cleansing, violence against immigrants, Palestinian self-determination, European unity — have **not exactly cried out for a Marxist vocabulary.** What about, say, Europe? Europe is a subject that absorbed much of Balibar’s attention in the 1990s and has continued to preoccupy him since — see Politics and the Other Scene (2002) and We, the People of Europe? (2004) as well as a volume now out in France, Europe, crise et fin? His latest pronouncements have been extremely pessimistic. But they emerge against his expectation that the project of European unification, rather than a ploy of the bankers and/or a creative new version of apartheid, might become a site of bottom-up democratic zeal and give birth to a new set of transnational institutions. As Žižek notes disapprovingly, this **hopefulness** sets Balibar against both the antistatism of the New Left and **current cynicism** about an emergent transnational politics of any kind. Balibar’s line on Europe is not that we should make the best of the European institutions we have, poor as their performance has been. Those institutions have failed, he says, definitively. Where he differs from his cohort is in his passionate will to see them replaced — in other words, his refusal to give up on Europe altogether. His critique of “**statism without a State”—technocratic top-down solutions to the European crisis** without encouragement of broad democratic participation — assumes (against Rancière’s argument in his own essay on French solidarity with Algeria) that democracy is possible not just on a national but a transnational scale. Balibar’s call for a left populism to counter the racist, xenophobic populism that threatens to become the only populism we can recognize in Europe also assumes (here he borrows from Rancière and diverges from Žižek) **that racism is not a fixed psychic quantity that cannot be diminished by any conceivable rejiggering of social arrangements.** And it assumes (arguing with both Žižek and Badiou) that democracy is a good in itself, and that, stretched and intensified, it might create the sort of European institutions that the victims of European integration (many of them, like the Greeks, still theoretically committed to the European Union) will like a lot better.

**2ac identity**

**Do Both- we can have contingent coalitions not rooted in static identity. These coalitions are *more effective***

**Butler, PhD, 90**

(Judith, Gender Trouble)

Some efforts have been made to formulate coalitional politics which do not assume in advance what the content of “women” will be. They propose instead a set of dialogic encounters by which variously positioned women articulate separate identities within the framework of an emergent coalition. Clearly, the value of coalitional politics is not to be underestimated, but the very form of coalition, of an emerging and unpredictable assemblage of positions, cannot be figured in advance. Despite the clearly democratizing impulse that motivates coalition building, the coalitional theorist can inadvertently reinsert herself **as sovereign** of the process by trying to assert an **ideal form for coalitional structures in advance**, one that will effectively guarantee unity as the outcome. Related efforts to determine what is and is not the true shape of a dialogue, what constitutes a subject-position, and, most importantly, when “unity” has been reached, can impede the self-shaping and self-limiting dynamics of coalition. The insistence in advance on coalitional “unity” as a goal assumes that solidarity, **whatever its price**, is a prerequisite for political action. But what sort of politics demands that kind of advance purchase on unity? Perhaps a coalition needs to acknowledge its contradictions and take action with those contradictions intact. Perhaps also part of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance of divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of the often tortuous process of democratization. The very notion of “dialogue” is **culturally specific and historically bound**, and while one speaker may feel secure that a conversation is happening, another may be sure it is not. The power relations that condition and limit dialogic possibilities need first to be interrogated. Otherwise, the model of dialogue risks relapsing into a liberal model that assumes that speaking agents occupy equal positions of power and speak with the same presuppositions about what constitutes “agreement” and “unity” and, indeed, that those are the goals to be sought. It would be wrong to assume in advance that there is a category of “women” that simply needs to be filled in with various components of race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexuality in order to become complete. The assumption of its essential incompleteness permits that category to serve as a permanently available site of contested meanings. The definitional incompleteness of the category might then serve as a normative ideal relieved of coercive force. Is “unity” necessary for effective political action? Is the premature insistence on the goal of unity precisely the cause of an ever more bitter fragmentation among the ranks? Certain forms of acknowledged fragmentation might facilitate coalitional action precisely because the “unity” of the category of women is neither presupposed nor desired. Does “unity” set up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity that rules out the possibility of a set of actions which disrupt the very borders of identity concepts, or which seek to accomplish precisely that disruption as an explicit political aim? Without the presupposition or goal of “unity,” which is, in either case, always instituted at a conceptual level, **provisional unities** might emerge in the context of concrete actions that have purposes other than the articulation of identity. Without the compulsory expectation that feminist actions must be instituted from some stable, unified, and agreed-upon identity, those actions might well get **a quicker start** and seem **more congenial** to a number of “women” for whom the meaning of the category is permanently moot. This antifoundationalist approach to coalitional politics assumes neither that “identity” is a premise nor that the shape or meaning of a coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its achievement. Because the articulation of an identity within available cultural terms instates a definition that **forecloses in advance** the emergence of new identity concepts in and through politically engaged actions, the foundationalist tactic cannot take the transformation or expansion of existing identity concepts as a normative goal. Moreover, when agreed-upon identities or agreed-upon dialogic structures, through which already established identities are communicated, no longer constitute the theme or subject of politics, then identities can come into being and dissolve depending on the concrete practices that constitute them. **Certain political practices institute identities on a contingent basis in order to accomplish whatever aims are in view**. Coalitional politics requires neither an expanded category of “women” nor an internally multiplicitous self that offers its complexity at once. Gender is a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given juncture in time. An open coalition, then, will affirm identities that are alternately instituted and relinquished according to the purposes at hand; it will be an open assemblage that permits of multiple convergences and divergences without obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure. (this is from a bootleg epub with no page numbers but this appears to be around page 15)

**2ac perm**

**Permutation do both – undertaking an intercommunal perspective incorporates the useful political programs of the alternative with the orientation and planning of the affirmative**

**Narayan 17** -- John Narayan (2017) Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK The wages of whiteness in the absence of wages: racial capitalism, reactionary intercommunalism and the rise of Trumpism, Third World Quarterly, 38:11, 2482-2500, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2017.1368012

Conclusion: dealing with the end of the wages of whiteness This article has attempted to retrieve Huey P. Newton’s seemingly forgotten theorisation of imperialism’s transition to reactionary intercommunalism, not only to achieve some form of epistemic justice, but also because Newton’s thought speaks urgently to our present. It has taken over 40 years for the contours of a truly global capitalism to match up with Newton’s proto-theorisation of neo-liberal globalisation. But Newton’s theoretical prescience also centres on his appreciation of how such changes would be refracted through issues of race and whiteness that underpin the US state and its economy. In conclusion, I want to reflect on Newton’s thought and why we should return to his ideas to understand the era of Trumpism. It is my contention that Newton’s reflection on what the future may hold under reactionary intercommunalism may in fact be words about our present. In a 1972 discussion with sociologists Franz Schurmann and Alberto Martinelli, Newton outlined his theory of intercommunalism and the future’s likely political trajectory. Newton’s main point to Schurmann and Martinelli was that the changes associated with reactionary intercommunalism, chiefly its technological displacement of jobs and the global spread of capitalist social relations, meant that Western imperialism’s wages of whiteness, where imperial conquest led to a bargain between capital and the white working and middle classes in the metropole, were effectively over. Indeed, as Newton told an audience at Yale in 1971, he hoped white America would unite with ‘those people who are already unemployable’, but whether this did or didn’t happen that ‘material existence will have changed. The proletarian will become the lumpen proletarian’.60 Newton’s interview with Schurmann and Martinelli saw him declare that either the white US population would come to terms with this reality, and embrace the objective class relations between themselves and the vast array of humanity, or they would start on a path towards world war three: The people here have to realize that they live at the expense of the world, and this includes the workers. Either the people will oppose the reactionary circle for survival, for peace, or else they will go into the third world war. So our basic problem is educating and organizing.61 Returning to Newton’s ruminations on the impossibly of resupplying the wages of whiteness highlights how dangerous the death of the wages of whiteness may actually be for us all today. Trumpism’s attempt to resupply the wages of whiteness through racism, nationalism and xenophobia, places humanity on a likely path towards war. Despite Trump’s claim that ‘jobs will return, incomes will rise and new factories will come rushing back to our shores’,62 Trumpism is unlikely to supply any jobs and material wages to its supporters because it is not designed or capable of doing so. Just as Du Bois highlighted at the start of the twentieth century that the wages of whiteness were designed by the elite to split class unity along racial lines, Trumpism’s wages of whiteness appear designed to split class unity for elite ends at the start of the twenty-first century. Trump’s economic plans, dubbed ‘Trumponomics’, essentially repackage neo-liberal ‘trickle-down’ policies with the promise of Keynesian stimulus. Trump has proposed massive infrastructure spending combined with huge tax cuts for the rich and corporations and further deregulation in the hope of generating investment and jobs. The 30-year track record of neo-liberalism has shown that these policies are unlikely to illicit investment in the economy and such a strategy seems incapable of addressing how technology, as Newton realised, will eliminate ever more jobs.63 As such, Trumpism will likely continue the processes of enriching elites and corporations at the expense of all members of the working and middle classes.64 This failure to supply the economic wages of whiteness will in turn likely be supplemented with the overtures to trade protectionism (Border Tax), racist and xenophobic polices such as (Muslim) travel bans, illegal migrant deportations, border wall building and military actions that aim to supply the psychological aspects of the wages of whiteness. This will simply be the supplying of the wages of whiteness in the absence of wages. There thus appears more chance that we shall see a race war in the US than any potential class struggle. However, the changes brought about by reactionary intercommunalism have also changed the nature of geo-politics and made such resurgent nationalism a more likely conduit for war on the international stage. The quest to remake the world in the American image, or rather in its interests, has enriched non-Western elites and empowered nations in the Global South in ways even Newton could not have foreseen. Although the ‘neo-liberalism with southern characteristics’ of the BRICS bloc does not yet mark an ideological and geo-political alternative to US and wider Western power, it does mark a world of increasing multi-polarity.65 What chance that a trade war or imperial proxy war induced by Trumpism could lead to what Newton called the third world war? Yet, Newton’s thought also offers us a vision of an alternative approach to dealing with the end of the wages of whiteness and perhaps herein lays the true value of returning to Newton in the age of Trumpism. Newton’s discussion with Schurmann and Martinelli revealed his frustration with the Western left’s fixation with the ‘factory as a phase that does not go through transformation’.66 In Newton’s eyes the left couldn’t simply repeat the fantasy of returning to the post-war settlement between labour and capital. Not only was such a position unachievable due to the changes induced by reactionary intercommunalism, but also because such a position failed to see how the post-war era of embedded liberalism was itself a racialised imperial formation. Newton argued against nostalgic pleas for national forms of socialism, which had been used to imperially split humanity across the colour-line, and for a transnational politics he called ‘Revolutionary intercommunalism’.67 Revolutionary intercommunalism functioned off the recognition of the interconnected nature of the global economy and the need to deliver equality and justice for the entirety of the world’s communities. Above all else, revolutionary intercommunalism rejected the idea that nationalist settlements, whether Black, white or socialist, were the pathways towards liberation. In light of reactionary intercommunalism’s global dimensions, Newton argued that only a global form of justice that would equally share the productivity and resource gains of technology would now suffice: In order for a revolution to occur in the United States you would have to have a redistribution of wealth not on a national or international level, but on an intercommunal level. Because how can we say that we have accomplished revolution if we redistribute the wealth just to people here in North America when the ruling circle itself is guilty of trespass de bonis asportatis. That is, they have taken away the goods of the people of the world, transported them to America and used them as their very own.68 Revolutionary intercommunalism saw the BPP create alliances with a plethora of social movements both within and beyond the US. These included the student-led anti-Vietnam War and Peace movements, Latino groups like the Young Lords Organisation and poor white American groups like the Young Patriots Organisation and ‘peoples of world’ pursuing nationhood, such the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (NLF), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). 69 The aim of revolutionary intercommunalism was not only to create a united front of oppressed peoples against global capitalism, but also to create alternative forms of life to the capitalist way of life. This ethos was exemplified in the BBP’s ‘survival programmes’, community-based programmes that were set-up and run by the Panthers and wider community to provide services such as free healthcare, free breakfasts for school children and free clothing for the Black community and other communities who had been excluded from the spoils of US capitalism. As Singh has suggested, the practices of the BPP’s survival programmes not only filled these gaps in welfare but also provided a ‘projection of sovereignty’ that rivalled the ‘reality principle’ of the US state.70 This entailed a practical deconstruction of the idea of state power (policing, education, welfare) that reimagined spaces and practices along new intercommunal lines of self-determination and democracy. Through attempting to disrupt class relations, racial segregation and gender roles, the BPP’s survival programmes also attempted to offer alternative ways of life, both institutionally and ideologically, to the racially divisive, class exploitative and gendered structures of capitalist society.71 The value of returning to Newton’s thought today thus lays not only with his appreciation of how reactionary intercommunalism would be refracted through issues of race and whiteness, but also with how Newton’s vision of revolutionary intercommunalism demands us to link the project of anti-imperialist solidarity with the creation of alternative intercommunal ways of life to capitalist society. This especially pertinent given that Trumpism’s critique of neo-liberal globalisation ironically shares elements of the left’s own social democratic critique of neo-liberal globalisation.72 Although violently disagreeing on the means, both Trumpism and social democracy aim towards the end of taming global capitalism through reasserting national controls (whether this is through racist approaches to immigration or raising taxes) and alleviating economic insecurity through job creation (whether this is through deregulation and tax cuts or increased regulation and government spending). Newton’s work on intercommunalism leads us to question the very categories of labour, nation, capital and democracy that underpin both Trumpism and contemporary social democratic politics. For example, Newton’s theory of intercommunalism makes it clear that we must question the linking of wage labour and income in an environment where technology eliminates vast sways of jobs and labour markets are racially discriminatory. Moreover, we must ask this question with a global rather than solely a national inflexion. Newton’s thought thus demands that we consider a new politics that would create new institutions and ideologies that could serve and liberate communities both within and beyond the boundaries of nation states. Returning to Newton’s theorisation of reactionary intercommunalism, and his conclusion that both white supremacy and nationally bounded socialism were incapable of dealing with the contradictions of global capital, thus implores us to pursue a politics of intercommunal revolution rather than mere national reform. This may sound idealistic as we encounter the re-emergence of racist populism in the US and wider Western world.73 However, Newton’s work reminds us that the contradictions of racial capitalism under the machinations of reactionary intercommunalism also offer the possibilities of hope as well as horror. Newton saw a chance for intercommunal solidarity and the creation of alternative forms of life because he believed the effects of the dwindling wages of whiteness now meant that the white populaces in the US were ‘more ready to fight’ than ever before. The key was to answer the questions ‘who shall he fight? Who is your enemy? Who is your friend?’ Newton challenged the left in the West ‘to show [that] the other unemployables are not the enemy’.74 In our contemporary moment these words, and the anti-racist and anti-imperialist politics they commit us to, seem as urgent as the time they were first spoken.

**The perm represents “mature marx”- their indicts will reinforce theologic interpretations at the expense of scripture- apply epistemic modesty**

**ROBBINS, PhD Harvard, 13**

(BRUCE, Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities, https://nplusonemag.com/issue-16/reviews/balibarism/)

AS A STUDENT OF ALTHUSSER IN THE 1960S, Balibar took to heart his master’s desire to detach Marxism from Hegel. Hegel was seen (a bit tendentiously) by Althusser and his disciples as a confident oracle of the End of History; and their aim was, through a close and even reverent reading of Marx’s texts, to expose a mature Marx who had been through an “**epistemological rupture**,” breaking with his early Hegelian faith, and who by the time he wrote Capital had embraced a **more complex and open-ended model of history**. History had to be interpreted the way Freud interpreted dreams — as motivated and structured, but with a quotient of randomness and openness to reinterpretation. Seeing history as analogous to dreams risked conceding that Marxism had something in common with wishful fantasy, but Althusser thought it made Marxism more scientific. In at least one sense it did: genuine science accepts the limits of its own knowledge. Balibar, not much interested in scientificity, was clearly enticed from the beginning **by modesty about the limits of knowledge**. Neither he nor Althusser put it this way, but their shared project might be described as a **secularizing of Marxism.** After Stalin, many thinkers were ready to abandon Marxism altogether. For those who wanted to save it — that was the grand but also defensive goal that Althusser announced to his students, Balibar among them, on the first day of the 1965 seminar that was to become Reading Capital — one option was to return to the founding texts of historical materialism and read them afresh, liberated from their **decades of service to Party dogma**. Like the Protestants of the Reformation, Marxists would get out from under the authority of the Church by appealing to the authority of Scripture. This of course would involve a resacralizing of Marx’s texts — something of an irony for a secularizing project. The secular always seems to need more secularizing. In this sense, Balibar’s series of studies from the 1980s (some of them collected in English under the title Masses, Classes and Ideas) was indeed secular and even detheologizing, a sort of Nietzschean–Rortyan experiment in thinking Marxism **without its god-terms**. For example, the concept of ideology went unmentioned in Marx’s Capital, Balibar observed, and this was because Capital had no need of it: if the fetishism of the commodity is working, it will do the job, mistakenly assigned to ideology, of making exploitation look like the breaks of the game. Balibar thus gently encouraged Marxists to make better use of their time than **accusing others of false consciousness.** Like ideology, the concept of the proletariat, so prominent in The Communist Manifesto, **could also be jettisoned**. According to the predictions of the mature Marx, the only class that would come to full political selfhood under the capitalist system is the bourgeoisie. **The proletariat names a political potential that could well remain unfulfilled** (as it has). This argument had the fortunate result of rendering unnecessary the proletariat’s predicted emergence as a self-conscious revolutionary subject; the usefulness of Marx’s analysis of capital could be demonstrated without it (as it has). Balibar was proposing in effect that Marx offered no providential assurance that things would work out in the end. This was Marxism without a Book of Revelation.

**2ac marxism fails**

**The worker has disappeared --- the lack of spatial proximity and continuity between workers denies the possibility of class solidarity fomenting meaningful resistance. Moreover, Marx’s economic theory understands labor as divisible into discrete units of time, but the floating, arbitrary value of money combined with the depersonalization of time means today’s cognitive worker no longer has no discrete surplus-value to be stolen**

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 138-42]

The recombinant **alliance** of **cognitive work and financial capital was over**. The young army of free agents, selfexploiters and virtual prosumers was transformed into modernity’s horde of precarious cognitive workers: **cognitarians**, cognitive proletarians and internet-slaves who invest nervous energy in exchange for a precarious revenue.

**Precarity is the general condition of semio-workers.** The essential feature of precarity in the social sphere is not the loss of regularity in the labour relation, since labour has always been more or less precarious, notwithstanding legal regulations. The essential transformation induced by the digitalization of the labour process is the fragmentation of the personal continuity of work, the fractalization and cellularization of time. The **worker disappears as a person**, and is replaced by abstract fragments of time. The cyberspace of global production can be viewed as an immense expanse of depersonalized human time. In the sphere of industrial production, abstract labour time was embodied in a worker of flesh and bone, with a certified and political identity. When the boss was in need of human time for capital valorization, he was obliged to hire a human being, and was obliged to deal with the physical weaknesses, maladies and rights of this human being; was obliged to face trade unions reclaims and the political demands of which the human was a bearer.

As we move into the age of info-labour, there is no longer a need to invest in the availability of a person for eight hours a day throughout the duration of his or her life. Capital no longer recruits people, but buys packets of time, separated from their interchangeable and occasional bearers. In the internet economy, flexibility has evolved into a form of fractalization of work.

Fractalization is the modular and recombinant fragmentation of the period of activity. The worker no longer exists as a person. He or she is only an interchangeable producer of micro-fragments of recombinant semiosis that enter into the continuous flux of the internet. Capital no longer pays for the availability of a worker to be exploited for a long period of time; it no longer pays a salary that covers the entire range of economic needs of a person who works.

The worker (a machine endowed with a brain that can be used for fragments of time) is paid for his or her occasional, temporary services. Work time is fragmented and cellularized. Cells of time are put up for sale online, and businesses can purchase as many of them as they want without being obligated in any way to provide any social protection to the worker. Depersonalized time has become the real agent of the process of valorization, and depersonalized time has no rights, no union organization and no political consciousness. It can only be either available or unavailable – although this latter alternative remains purely theoretical inasmuch as the physical body still has to buy food and pay rent, despite not being a legally recognized person.

The time necessary to produce the info-commodity is liquefied by the recombinant digital machine. The human machine is there, pulsating and available, like a brainsprawl in waiting. The extension of time is meticulously cellularized: cells of productive time can be mobilized in punctual, casual and fragmentary forms. The recombination of these fragments is automatically realized in the network. The mobile phone is the tool that makes possible the connection between the needs of semiocapital and the mobilization of the living labour of cyberspace. The ringtone of the mobile phone summons workers to reconnect their abstract time to the reticular flux.

In this new labour dimension, people have no right to protect or negotiate the time of which they are formally the proprietors, but are effectively expropriated. That time does not really belong to them, because it is separated from the social existence of the people who make it available to the recombinant cyber-productive circuit. The time of work is fractalized, reduced to minimal fragments that can be reassembled, and the fractalization makes it possible for capital to constantly find the conditions of the minimal salary. **Fractalized work can punctually rebel, here and there, at certain points – but this does not set into motion any concerted endeavour of resistance.**

**Only the spatial proximity of the bodies of labourers and the continuity of the experience of working together lead to the possibility of a continuous process of solidarity**. Without this proximity and this continuity, the conditions for the cellularized bodies to coalesce into community do not pertain. Individual behaviours can only come together to form a substantive collective momentum when there is a **continuous proximity in time, a proximity that info-labour no longer makes possible.**

Cognitive activity has always been involved in every kind of human production, even that of a more mechanical type. There is no process of human labour that does not involve an exercise of intelligence. But today, **cognitive capacity is becoming the essential productive resource**. In the age of industrial labour, the mind was put to work as a repetitive automatism, the neurological director of muscular effort. While industrial work was essentially repetition of physical acts, mental work is continuously changing its object and its procedures.

Thus, the subsumption of the mind in the process of capitalist valorization leads to a true mutation. The conscious and sensitive organism is subjected to a growing competitive pressure, to an acceleration of stimuli, to a constant exertion of his/her attention. As a consequence, the mental environment, the info-sphere in which the mind is formed and enters into relations with other minds, becomes a psychopathogenic environment.

To understand semiocapital’s infinite game of mirrors, we must first outline a new disciplinary field, delimited by three aspects: the critique of political economy of connective intelligence; the semiology of linguistic-economic fluxes; and the psychochemistry of the info-sphere, focused on the study of the psychopathological effects of the mental exploitation caused by the acceleration of the info-sphere.

In the connected world, the retroactive loops of general systems theory are fused with the dynamic logic of biogenetics to form a post-human vision of digital production. Human minds and flesh are integrated with digital circuits thanks to interfaces of acceleration and simplification: a model of bio-info production is emerging that produces semiotic artefacts with the capacity for the auto- replication of living systems. Once fully operative, the digital nervous system can be rapidly installed in every form of organization.

The digital network is provoking an intensification of the info-stimuli, and these are transmitted from the social brain to individual brains. This **acceleration is a pathogenic factor that has wide-ranging effects in society.** Since capitalism is wired into the social brain, a psychotic meme of acceleration acts as pathological agent: the organism is **drawn into a spasm until collapse**.

**The bourgeoisie has disappeared: in the regime of semiocapitalism, there’s nothing to rebel against. Their replacement, the “elsewhere class,” engages in a constant reterritorialization of random financial value that makes effective resistance impossible.**

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 76-80]

Semiocapital and the Ethics of Baroque

Crime used to be a secret act. In the age of repression and industriousness, when the morality of the bourgeoisie was reigning, crime wanted to be secret. Law aimed at preventing crime, and it encouraged investigations of criminals in order to punish them.

This order of things has irrevocably changed in the last turn of time, especially since the advent of the semiocapitalist regime.

Semiocapitalism occupies the sphere of randomness of value, as well as the sphere of **randomness of law** and of moral judgement.

The entire strategy of the system lies in this **hyper-reality of floating values**. It is the same for money and theory as for the unconscious. Value rules according to an ungraspable order: the generation of models, the indefinite chaining of simulation. Cybernetic operationality, the genetic code, the random order of mutations, the principle of uncertainty, and so on: all of these replace a determinist and objectivist science, a dialectical vision of history and consciousness.1

Baudrillard is talking of value in economic terms. In the post-Fordist transition, the relation between work-time and value is jeopardized, as immaterial production and cognitive work are difficult to properly gauge. But the random effect is not limited to the sphere of the economy, as it spreads both to the sphere of social relations and to that of ethics.

The current, generalized perception of widespread corruption is neither a superficial impression, nor the effect of a deterioration of the moral character of people.

**It is a systemic effect of the randomization of value**. When value can no longer be determined by the precise relation to work-time, its determinant factors become **deception**, **swindle**, **violence**. Mafia ceases to be a marginal phenomenon of lawlessness, instead becoming the prevailing force of emerging capitalist economies like Russia and Mexico. At the same time, fraud is legalized and organized in the global financial market as a systemic feature.

As it becomes increasingly institutionalized, crime loses its secrecy and demands access to the spectacle. The visibility of crime becomes part of the effectiveness and persuasiveness of power. Competition is all about subduing, cheating, predating. Blaming the victims is part of the game: you are guilty of your inability to subdue, to cheat and to plunder, therefore you will be submitted to the blackmail of debt and to the tyranny of austerity.

Nazism already enacted spectacular crime as a means to secure absolute power, but the criminal acts conducted in the name of the ‘Final Solution’ were secretly organized and performed away from the public eye. Evil was proclaimed and simultaneously denied in the name of the superior values of family, homeland and God. On the contrary, reclaiming evil has become commonplace in today’s financial markets, as the old ethics of bourgeois Protestantism is progressively cancelled by the neobaroque, post-bourgeois ethics of the deterritorialized financial class.

The bourgeoisie was a strongly territorialized class, whose power was based on the property of physical assets, and on the fact of belonging to a stable community. Protestant ethics was based on the long-lasting relationship between the religious community and the labourers and consumers who shared the same place and the same destiny.

Nowadays, **the bourgeoisie has disappeared**. The financial deterritorialization is generating a post-bourgeois class, which has no relation to the territory and to community.

It is a class that is not concerned with the future of any specific territorial community, because tomorrow it will move its business to a different part of the world. We might call it the ‘elsewhere class’, as it continuously displaces the stakes of its investment. But we may also call it a ‘virtual class’, for two reasons: because it is the class that gains profits from virtual activities, like net trading, and high tech immaterial production; and because it is the class that does not actually exist. Identifying those who are investing in the financial market is difficult, impossible, as everybody is obliged to depend on it.

In a sense, everybody is part of the class that is investing in the financial market. Including myself. As a teacher I am bound to wait for a pension, and I know that my pension will be paid if some investment funds will be profitable, therefore I am obliged to depend for my **future revenue** on the **profitability of the financial market**. **The ‘elsewhere class’** has re-established the economic rationale of the rentier, as profit is no longer linked to the expansion of the existing wealth, but is linked to the mere possession of an invisible asset: money, or, more accurately, credit.

According to Thomas Stewart:

Money has dematerialized. Once upon a time officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were loading gold bars onto trolleys and rolled them from one country’s basement to another. Today some 1.3 trillion in currency is traded every day, and never takes a tangible form.

Money has turned ethereal, volatile and electronic. Nothing more than an assemblage of ones and zeros that are piped through miles of wire, pumped over fiberoptic highways, bounced off satellites, and beamed from one microwave relay station to another. This new money is like a shadow. It has no tactile dimension, no heft or weight. Money is an image.2

The **post-bourgeois class of virtual finance has no homeland, no community, no belonging, and also no money**. Just faith. Faith in signs, in figures. The post-bourgeois class announces the return of the baroque.

Although defeated and marginalized during the age of bourgeois progress and the rational organization of social life, the baroque has never disappeared.

Its spirit is based on the primacy of the spectacle, on the multiplication of possible interpretations, on randomness of value and of meaning, or the potency of **arbitrary** and **violent will**. Not surprisingly, Curzio Malaparte, a writer who took part in Italian Fascism before changing his position during the Second World War, in Europa vivente, published in 1925, speaks of Italian Fascism as a return of the baroque. Northern Europeans are wrong to think that modernity is only a Protestant business, says Malaparte. Fascism is the reclaiming of the modern soul of Southern Europeans, and the political spectacle of Mussolini is the resurgence of the baroque cult of inessentiality, decoration, excess: arbitrary power.

But arbitrariness is not only a **defining feature** of Fascism, it is also the **quintessential character** of the **semio capitalist** form of **accumulation**. The power of the resurgent baroque is fully exposed by the transformation of the economy into **semioproduction**. When **language**, **imagination**, **information** and **immaterial flows** become the force of production and the general space of exchange, when property is deterritorialized and becomes immaterial, the **baroque spirit** becomes the all-encompassing form, both of the economy and of ethical discourse.

**2ac anti-blackness turns**

**The freedom of the anti-capitalist worker is premised upon a denial of blackness because it remains on the terrain of beings. Their claim to produce freedom for blackness relies on a vicious ruse of analogy that re-elaborates on the conditions of slavery.**

**Barber** (Daniel Colucciello, Department Member ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry) **2016** (The Creation of Non-Being, Rhizome, Issue 29, <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html>, C.A.)

[28] This is to name the essential limit of Lazzarato's account as the failure to analyze the ways in which the domination of **capitalism is constituted by** the domination of **anti-blackness**. In making this claim, I am following Wilderson's argument that "the privileged subject of Marxist discourse is a subaltern who is approached by variable capital—a wage. In other words, Marxism assumes a subaltern structured by capital, not by white supremacy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). The essential limit of Marxism, he argues, is its theorization of capitalism in terms of "exploitation (rather than accumulation and death)" (Wilderson 2003: 234). **Marxism** thus begins from and **stays within the being of whiteness**, a being whose coherence is premised on the denial of the fact that capital "was **kick-started by approaching a** particular body (a **Black body**) **with direct relations of force, not by approaching a White body with variable capital"** (Wilderson 2003: 230). [29] The position of the worker, in virtue of its raced difference from the position of the slave, asserts a capacity for analogical relation—even amidst exploitation—with the exploiter. The exploited and the exploiter, despite their asymmetry, share a being that is made through the denial of blackness, which is positioned as the slave; the worker possesses an analogical relation to the owner that the slave does not. **To presume that the slave** position **can be analogized with the worker** position **is thus** to attribute the latter's analogical capacity to the former, which is without analogy. It is to presume an analogy between what is capable of being analogous with what is not: **"the ruse of analogy"** (Wilderson 2010: 37). [30] This means, as well, that **there can be no question of an intersection** between separate but equal spheres of class and anti-black racism, much less of an account that takes up anti-blackness as a means of proceeding toward a supposedly essential antagonism of class. Against such accounts, Wilderson remarks that, within them, "racism is read off the base, as it were, as being derivative of political economy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). On the contrary, what is essential is anti-black racism, or the incommensurability between non-being and being: class division concerns relations between analogizable terms (owner and worker) that, however conflictual or exploitative, presume a common being, a being whose making—and being made coherent—is premised on (the denial of) the real non-being of the slave. [31] All this is to say that anti-black racial ontology is the condition of possibility for the Marxist demand—central to Lazzarato's own version of autonomist Marxism—for being free from exploitation. As Christina Sharpe remarks: "The legal captivity of Africans and their descendants was central to the codification of rights and freedoms for those legally constituted as white and their legally white descendants. That is, freedoms for those people constituted as white were and are produced through an other's body legally and otherwise being made to wear unfreedom and to serve as a placeholder for access to the freedoms that are denied the black subject" (Sharpe 2010: 15). The being of freedom, or the articulation of a free being – that is, **the very link between being and freedom—is premised upon a denial of blackness**, or non-being. This is the case even (or especially) when freedom is expressed as a possibility, for such possibility—pertaining only to that which has already emerged as being—cannot articulate that which this emergence denies. As Saidiya V. Hartman remarks, **the "language of freedom** no longer **becomes** that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but **the site of the re-elaboration of that condition**" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185). [32] **Freedom names the modulative, mutational possibilities of being(s**). **Marxist discourse, however innovative, addresses free beings, or the being of freedom. It leaves unthought non-being, the reality of which is logically prior to all being, and thus to all possibilities of being.** It is for this reason that **Lazzarato's account of capitalism in terms of debt, while an extremely innovative form of contemporary Marxism, still fails to articulate the essential antagonism of non-being**.[[17]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-17) When Lazzarato speaks of the indebted man, of the "we" of debt inheritance, he is speaking of the position that Marxism ascribes to the worker—instead of a capital-work relation we have, in Lazzarato, a credit-debt relation.[[18]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-18) Debt innovatively re-defines the meaning of work, but it does not change the positionality of the worker, which remains as the position of the debtor.[[19]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-19) His critique proceeds in virtue of a link—foreclosed by debt—between being and freedom, without ever articulating that the very possibility of this link is premised on the denial of non-being, on the making of blackness as that which is without the possibility of being free. Lazzarato thereby fails to address how the being of the worker, now the indebted man, is rendered visible by standing out against the background of (black) flesh.[[20]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-20)

**The focus on exploitation of the worker cannot grapple with black non-being because exploitation occurs through the inheritance of debt which presumes a being which has the capacity to inherit. It is precisely through this capacity that the worker can still identify with the “we” of humanity.**

**Barber** (Daniel Colucciello, Department Member ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry) **2016** (The Creation of Non-Being, Rhizome, Issue 29, <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html>, C.A.)

[17] **A central feature of control is debt**. As Deleuze remarks, "A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt" (Deleuze 1997: 179). The experience of the indebted man is one of endless postponement, for the creditor-debtor relation sets the terms, in the present, for the future of this relation. Otherwise put, the relation between present and future is circumscribed within the relation between creditor and debtor: to have credit is to have the future as a present creditor; to have debt is to have the future as a present debtor. The future is given credit by the present, or the future is what one is given to pay off the debt of the present. In such a relation, **the future is endlessly postponed while the present remains, endures, as credit and debt. Any negativity toward the present is foreclosed**, and so the future is never created. [18] Yet Deleuze's analysis of control, and thereby of debt, is inchoate. For this reason, it will be useful to turn to the arguments set forth in Lazzarato's recent text, The Making of the Indebted Man, which offers a thoroughgoing development of the insights of Deleuze's analysis. The usefulness of this text arises, additionally, from the fact that Lazzarato—unlike many who work in a Deleuzian vein—tends to avoid dependence on an ineliminable excess of being that is presumed to overcome the limits of the present. Rather than treat Deleuze's thought as the index of an indefatigable, constitutive power of being that guarantees political possibility, **Lazzarato attends to the ways in which control has foreclosed such possibility**. As such, Lazzarato is perhaps the best available candidate for **exemplifying Deleuzian thought without the presumption of affirmation**. [19] Lazzarato presents the indebted man as the subjective terrain of communicative capitalism's apparatus of control, and in doing so develops some of Deleuze's central claims. For instance, he observes how debt "preempts non-chronological time, each person's future as well as the future of society as a whole," and contends that debt is the "principal explanation for the strange sensation of living in a society without time, without possibility, without foreseeable rupture" (Lazzarato 2012: 46-47). Furthermore, he confirms that debt marks the appearance of capitalism's capacity to make being as such, and thus to make the future: "The power of capitalism, like the world it aims to appropriate and control, is always in the process of being made" (Lazzarato 2012: 107). [20] **Lazzarato offers a key advance on Deleuze with his emphasis on the aforementioned being-making capacity of capitalism**. Specifically, he insists that **debt is not a scientific necessity**—something that stems from autonomous economic laws—**but rather a product of power**. Debt belongs to the exercise of power, and as such it is a making of beings that are logically prior to—and thus do not gain their coherence through—any science of economy. "Measure, evaluation, and appraisal"—the means by which debt expresses and constructs itself—"all arise from the question of power, before there is any question of economics" (Lazzarato 2012: 80). It is in virtue of the centrality of power within his analysis that Lazzarato offers an additional advance: the claim that attention to the debt-relation is inseparable from attention to the Christian relation. The power at issue, Lazzarato argues, is one in which the "origin of valuation and measure is both religious and political" (Lazzarato 2012: 81). [21] Lazzarato's theorization of **capitalism as a power to make the debt-relation**—and not as a secular science regulating this relation—**leads him to introduce and emphasize the Christian valence of "debt obligations**" (Lazzarato 2012: 40-41). He argues that what makes the debt-relation hold (as its necessary, if not sufficient, condition) is obligation, and that the theorization of this obligation requires attending to the Christian character of debt. Being is made through the establishment of a creditor-debtor relation, yet **essential to this relation is the establishment of obligation**, and obligation, Lazzarato argues, is **established by Christianity** (from which capitalism inherits it). Simply put, the making of beings through debt is made through obligation, which is made through Christianity. It is along these lines that he claims **we are now "indebted to the 'god' Capital"** (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Lazzarato's analysis of the debt-relation thereby demonstrates that the power by which capitalism makes being is bound up with a power named by Christianity. Capitalist power must then be analyzed in its undividedness from Christian power, and in a way that attends to the negativity of non-being against being. Asymmetry as Analogy [22] One way of addressing this task is to think debt as inheritance—that is, to think the inheritance of Christian debt by capitalism, and in doing so to think how **a capacity of being is inherited by capitalism from Christianity**. We inherit debt, and debt requires that our future be inherited—ahead of time—as the debt enacted in the present. But it is not just that debt is inherited, it is also that **debt constitutes its inheritors as** something, as beings analogically **belonging to a "we."** Note, for instance, the collective first-person of Lazzarato's claim: "We are no longer the inheritors of original sin but rather of the debt of preceding generations" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Who is "we"? [23] It is by way of this question that one begins to encounter a limit of Lazzarato's analysis, which I will address in a logical register before returning to the explicitly historical marks of the inheritance that he tracks. **This limit**, logically speaking, **is Lazzarato's focus on asymmetry**. He clearly observes the injustice of the debt-relation by articulating the deep asymmetry between creditor and debtor.[[11]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-11)While this observation is not incorrect, the approach to which it belongs ignores the ways in which **asymmetry remains within being**. In order for one thing to be communicated as asymmetrical with or disproportionate to another thing, these things must be analogical to one another, possessing a minimal degree of likeness or commonality. Therefore creditor and debtor, despite the extremity of their asymmetry, remain analogous to each other as beings. [24] This is to say that the debt-relation operates as a domain of analogous being, and that **Lazzarato**—by presupposing and leaving in place this domain—**fails to encounter the negativity of non-being**.[[12]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-12)Whereas asymmetry presupposes the commonality and analogical relation of beings, non-being names that which is without being, and thus without analogical relation to being(s): **something and nothing are not asymmetrical but incommensurable**. Lazzarato's critique of debt, by focusing on asymmetry, ignores this absence of analogy between being (whether positive or negative, creditor or debtor) and non-being, and so it can only amount to a modulation of being—that is, a modulation ofwe. [25] Returning to Lazzarato's history of Christian-capitalist inheritance, I contend that this modulation is evident as an apparent transmutation within the "we": we were **once the inheritors of original sin**, whereas we are **now the inheritors of debt.** Yet a deeper continuity remains, for while we are different, it is we who have undergone—and survived—discontinuity: **we are still we**. Previously we inherited original sin, whereas now we inherit debt, but we are still those who inherit—and, in virtue of this being-inherited or inheriting-being, we are something. We are we, and we remain we, across any apparent discontinuity of Christianity and capitalism, **because what remains**, what is constant, **is the capacity to inherit**. Such inheritance is not so happy, of course, for to inherit sin, or to inherit debt, is to be exploited by God or capital. Yet this structure of exploitation maintains an analogy between exploiter and exploited: we are exploited, but **precisely through this exploitation**, this inheritance of debt, we still know ourselves as we. [26] In this sense, "we" names the inherited capacity to be-something, or the capacity to inherit being. What is ultimately inherited is not debt so much as this capacity: the debt that exploits is the debt that gives being, that gives the capacity to be in analogy with other beings, and thus to participate in or communicate as we. To frame the inheritance of debt primarily in terms of its asymmetry or exploitation is thus to obscure the fact that inheritability, or the ability to inherit, is the common or communicable being underlying all asymmetry. This is to say that **Lazzarato focuses** his analysis **on the conflictual relation between beings of the anti-black world and thereby fails to address the more essential antagonism between blackness and the world**. Lazzarato remains within the being of inheritance, or within the we that underlies and guarantees the "coherence"[[13]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-13) (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 187) of asymmetrical relation, whereas **any break with the present** must be articulated according to blackness, which is without relation. [27] The break, then, **must be articulated according to the uninheritability of blackness**. For Lazzarato, however, blackness remains in "the position of the unthought" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185), and this is precisely because he adheres to the universalizable horizon of the we. "Everyone is a 'debtor,' accountable to and guilty before. Capital has become the Great Creditor, the Universal Creditor" (Lazzarato 2012: 11).[[14]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-14) Yet it is clear that there are those who do not participate in the we of the indebted man.[[15]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-15) Logically prior to the domination articulated via asymmetrical relations of we (inheritance of debt), there is domination articulated as non-being: "the damned of the earth"[[16]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-16) do not inherit.

**Their move to call us individualistic masks the whites as the collective and demonize people who challenge racial and sexual violence – that allows that violence to continue and reifies neoliberalism**

**Ahmed in 14** <Sara. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London. “Selfcare as welfare” August 25, 2014. http://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/>

Audre Lorde writes persuasively about how self-care can become an obscurant, how caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle. And yet, in A Burst of Light, she defends self-care as not about self-indulgence, but self-preservation. Self-care becomes warfare. This kind of self-care is not about one’s own happiness. It is about finding ways to exist in a world that is diminishing. Already: we have been given some tools to sharpen our understanding of how neo-liberalism can be used as a tool. There are differences that matter, differences that matter relating to differences of power. Neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all forms of self-care become symptoms of neo-liberalism. When feminist, queer and anti-racist work that involves sharing our feelings, our hurt and grief, recognising that power gets right to the bone, is called neo-liberalism, we have to hear what is not being heard. When feminism involves recognising the suffering of say, an individual woman of colour at the hands of a sexist, heterosexist, and racist system that is indifferent to the suffering it causes and that is called neoliberalism, you would be repeating rather than challenging this structural indifference. And you also negate other “other histories” that are at stake in her struggle for her suffering to matter. Those who do not have to struggle for their own survival can very easily and rather quickly dismiss those who have to struggle for survival as “indulging themselves.” As feminism teaches us: **talking about personal feelings is not necessarily about deflecting attention from structures**. If anything, I would argue the opposite: **not addressing certain histories that hurt, histories that get to the bone, how we are affected by what we come up against, is one way of deflecting attention from structures** (as if our concern with our own pain or suffering is what stops certain things from just “going away”). Not the only way, but one way. If you have got a model that says an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety, by trying to work out ways she can keep on going or ways she can participate in something without having to experience more trauma (by asking for trigger warnings in a classroom, for instance) is participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up “the ladder” in a company then I think there is something wrong with your model. Sometimes, “coping with” or “getting by” or “making do” might appear as a way of not attending to structural inequalities, as benefiting from a system by adapting to it, even if you are not privileged by that system, even if you are damaged by that system. Perhaps we need to ask: who has enough resources not to have to become resourceful? When you have less resources you might have to become more resourceful. Of course: the requirement to become more resourceful is part of the the injustice of a system that distributes resources unequally. Of course: becoming resourceful is not system changing even if it can be life changing (although maybe, just maybe, a collective refusal not to not exist can be system changing). But to assume people’s ordinary ways of coping with injustices implies some sort of failure on their part – or even an identification with the system – is another injustice they have to cope with. The more resources you have the easier it is to make such a critique of those whose response to injustice is to become more resourceful. You might not be trying to move up, to project yourself forward; you might simply be trying not to be brought down. Heavy, heavy histories. Wearing, worn down. Even if it’s system change we need, that we fight for, when the system does not change, when the walls come up, those hardenings of history into physical barriers in the present, you have to manage; to cope. Your choices are compromised when a world is compromised. It is not surprising: some recent anti-feminist, anti-queer and anti-intersectionality (intersectionality as code for people of colour) statements from the “white male left” rest on charging us with being individualistic, as indulging ourselves, as being concerned with ourselves and our own damaged “identities.” I wonder if Audre Lorde might have had to insist that self-care was not self-indulgence because she had heard this charge. I wonder. I have read recently some critiques of feminists for calling out individuals for sexism and racism because those critiques neglect (we neglect) structures. Really? Or is that when we talk about sexism and racism you hear us as talking about individuals? Are you suddenly concerned with structures because you do not want to hear how you as an individual might be implicated in the power relations we critique? I noted in my book, On Being Included (2012) how there can be a certain safety in terms like “institutional racism” in a context where individuals have disidentified from institutions they can see themselves as not “in it” at all. And how interesting: the individual disappears at the very moment he is called to account. He will probably reappear as the saviour of the left. You can hear, no doubt, my tiredness and cynicism. I do not apologise for it. I am tired of it. Some of the glib dismissals of “call out culture” make my blood boil. I say glib because they imply it is easy to call people out, or even that it has become a new social norm. I know, for instance, how hard it is to get sexual harassment taken seriously. Individuals get away with it all the time. They get away with it because of the system. It is normalised and understood as the way things are. Individual women have to speak out, and testify over and over again; and still there is a system in place, a system that is working, that stops women from being heard. In a case when a woman is harassed by an individual man, she has to work hard to call him out. She often has to keep saying it because he keeps doing it. Calling out an individual matters, even when the system is also what is bruising: the violence directed against you by somebody is a violence that leaves a trace upon you whether that trace is visible or not. And: there is a system which creates him, supports him, and gives him a sense that he has a right to do what he does. To challenge him is to challenge a system. I read one anti-feminist article that implied feminists are being individualistic, when they call out individual men, because that calling out is what stops us working more collectively for radical transformation. **Collectivity: can work for some individuals as a means for disguising their own interest as collective interest**. When collectivity requires you to bracket your experience of oppression **it is not a collectivity worth fighting for**. And I have watched this happen with feminist despair: when women speak out about sexual harassment and sexual violence they are heard as compromising the whole thing: a project, a centre, a revolution. And the individuals they speak of are then presented as the ones who have to suffer the consequences of feminist complaint, the one’s whose damage is generalised (if “he” is damaged “we” are damaged). When her testimony is heard as damaging the possibility of revolting against a system, **a system is reproduced**. I will say it again: the individual seems to disappear at the moment he is called to account. We are the ones who then appear as individuals, who are assumed to be acting as individuals or even as being individualistic, while he disappears into a collective. From my study of will and willfulness, I learnt how those who challenge power are often judged as promoting themselves, as putting themselves first, as self-promotional. And maybe: the judgment does find us somewhere. We might have to promote ourselves when we are not promoted by virtue of our membership of a group. We might have to become assertive just to appear. For others, you appear and you are attended to right away. A world is waiting for you to appear. The one who can quickly disappear when called to account can then quickly re-appear when on the receiving end of an action that is welcomed or desired. I think of these differences as how we become assembled over and by tables. Two women seated together at a table, let’s say. Sometimes you might have to wave your arm, your willful arm, just to be noticed. Without a man at the table you tend not to appear. For others, to be seated is not only to be seen, but to be seen to. You can take up a place at the table when you have already been given a place. You do not have to become self-willed if your will is accomplished by the general will. This is why the general dismissal of feminism as identity politics (and there is a history to how identity politics becomes a dismissal) needs to be treated as a form of conservatism: it is an attempt to conserve power by assuming those who challenge power are just concerned with or about themselves. An individual is one who is not dividable into parts. In Willful Subjects (2014), I tied the history of the individual as the one who does not have to divide himself to a patriarchal, colonial and capitalist history. He can be an individual, not divided into parts, because others become his parts: they become his arms, his feet, his hands, limbs that are intended to give support to his body. When a secretary becomes his right hand, his right hand is freed. Your labour as support for his freedom. This is how the question of support returns us to bodies, to how bodies are supported. Willful parts are those who are unwilling to provide this support. So how quickly those who resist their subordination are judged as being individualistic as well as willful. In refusing to support him, by becoming his parts, we have become self-willed; in refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this “for” is assumed as only and lonely. **Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare**. In directing our care towards ourselves we are redirecting care away from its proper objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for; we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about. And that is why in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community, fragile communities, assembled out of the experiences of being shattered. We reassemble ourselves through the ordinary, everyday and often painstaking work of looking after ourselves; looking after each other. This is why when we have to insist, I matter, we matter, we are transforming what matters. Women’s lives matter; black lives matter; queer lives matter; disabled lives matter; trans lives matter; the poor; the elderly; the incarcerated, matter**. For those who have to insist they matter to matter: selfcare is warfare.**

**It also means the alt fails because reading racist and sexist violence as extrinsic effects of capital alienates people from the proletariat movement against capitalism**

**Belkhir in 1** <Jean Ait. “Marxism Without Apologies: Integrating Race, Gender, Class; A Working Class Approach” Race, Gender & Class8.2 (Apr 30, 2001): 142.>

More than ever there is a need for the continued struggle against historical social inequalities based on race, class and gender. We need to integrate racism, sexism and classism into the Marxist analysis of capitalism in which race or gender or class serves as a point of entry through which the varied forms of social inequality can and must be understood. Thus, in recognizing the centrality of race, gender and class issues in the struggle against economic inequality and exploitation and cultural subordination and domination, we will be able to avoid the dramatic mistakes of the past that considered racism, sexism and classism as divisive issues.¶ Marxism and the "Woman Question"¶ In their article Marxist Theory and the Oppression of Women, Morrissey & Stoecker (1994) argue "those who follow Marx and Engels are left with a Marxist theory that is ambiguous on whether the source of women's oppression might be independent of the source of capitalism and whether this oppression could be ended by ending capitalism alone." Feminism often suggests that Marxism produced virtually nothing of real usefulness about gender inequality and the liberation of women. For Vogel (1983): "Marx and his collaborator Engels had little to say about the emancipation of women.... For them it was a marginal problem." As a result, the sexist bias in Marxism contributed to the growth of distortions in their analysis of capitalism. In her famous article entitled: The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, Hartman (1981) argued that: "The marriage of Marxism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism." As such feminists argued (e.g., Hartman, 1981), since capital and private property do not cause the inequality of women, **their abolition alone will not result in the end of gender inequality**. Only specifically feminist analysis revealed the systemic character of the patriarchal relations between men and women necessary to understand gender inequality.¶ Most women writing on feminism began with the central notion that there was a distinction between sex and gender and argued that "women" were not born, but made: the problem was culture, not nature that were at the center of women's so-called inferiority. Other feminist writers also argued that the end of capitalism or patriarchy would not necessarily end the objectification and "subordination" of women because the control was within culture and the unconscious. Some feminist theorists believe that the gender hierarchical system is more deeply embedded in the male ego and thus, the various changes in the social order have remained male dominated, whether capitalist, socialist, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or liberal. Central to the reproduction of the "inferiorisation of women" is the socialization process of children outside and inside the home where "the patriarchal ideology, that men are superior to women," are taught and, where the inferior position of women is reinforced by the churches, unions, armies, factories, offices, media, publicity, schools, etc. The extensive list of practices, such as clitoridectomy, infibulation, prostitution, pornography, rape, foot-banding, body-veiling, involuntary sterilization, and sex-object advertising, illustrate the unequal power relationship of women to men, and finally, modern Asia's anomaly; the girls who do not get born.¶ MARXISM AND THE "RACE PROBLEM."¶ Although much contemporary sociological writing concerns itself with analyses of race, theories of racial ethnic inequality have never been a priority in Marxist social science. As Geschwender & Levine (1994) reminds us: "Classical social theorists, such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, were not concerned with the race problem...The authors conclude their reviews of Classical and Recent Theoretical Developments in the Marxist Analysis of Race and Ethnicity in regretting that certain Marxist theorists make the error of denying the race problem in the U.S. For instance, Bonacich (1980) reduced racism to an **ideological adjunct to class exploitation.** Wallerstein (1972) came very close to eliminating the concept together by stripping it of any meaning independent of the exploitation process.¶ As consequence, Manning Marable (1996) argues that racism has blunted the critical faculties of white progressives from the colonial period to the present Blacks have seen an endless series of prominent white liberal and progressive allies **betray their trust and embrace the politics of white supremacy**. Marxists have always insisted that the flow of social history is determined by the relationship between subjective and objective factors -- the superstructure or ideological, cultural, and political apparatuses and the base, or forces of production. But what most American progressives and Marxists adhered to was a philosophy not of Marxism -- which also suggests that the relations between superstructure and base are reciprocal, each affecting the other -- but of economic determinism. Racism was, therefore, only part of the larger class question. Small wonder, then, that until today, **no progressive or Marxist white organizations**, Old Left or New, **had won over any significant number of black and people of color activists, intellectuals, or workers.**

**2ac left melancholy turn**

**The negative’s nostalgia for an anti-capitalism before post structuralism is left melancholy -- causes more political inaction**

**Dean 14** [*Contemporary Political Theory*, 4 November 2014, “Radicalism restored? Communism and the end of left melancholia,” Jonathan, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds]

- The left likes to blame capitalism on everything and then we don’t know how to come up with effective resistances outside of cap (fem, queer, etc.) leads to clogging because we can only think in terms of capitalism

The use of melancholia as an analytical category has its roots in Freudian psychoanalysis, and is to be distinguished from the related concept of mourning. For Freud, the latter refers to the (non-pathological) process of working through an acknowledged ‘loss of a loved person, or of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on’ (Freud, 2001, p. 243). Crucially, after a period of mourning is completed ‘the ego becomes free and uninhibited again’ (2001, p. 243) but melancholia, by contrast, is ‘related to an object loss that is withdrawn from consciousness’ (2001, p. 245), and as such it remains unacknowledged, enduring and intransigent. A number of authors have argued that Freud’s distinction between mourning and melancholia can help capture something specific about the affects and dispositions of the academic left. Wendy Brown’s 1999 essay ‘Resisting Left Melancholy’ remains the standard-bearer. Drawing on Freud, Walter Benjamin and Stuart Hall, Brown argues that the left-wing melancholic is ‘attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present’ (Brown, 1999, p. 20). Left-wing melancholy, says Brown, ‘signifies a certain narcissism with regard to one’s past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance or transformation’ (1999, p. 20). But what precisely is it that has brought about this pervasive left-wing melancholy? Brown’s answer is twofold. First, she argues that the discourse of the left-wing melancholic frequently cites the turn to so-called ‘cultural politics’ or ‘identity politics’ – in which struggles around gender, race and sexuality are seen to have displaced the traditional focus on class – as having caused a crisis and loss of focus (1999, p. 23). The second alleged culprit – in the eyes of the left-wing melancholic – is the turn to ‘poststructuralism, discourse analysis, postmodernism, trendy literary theory got up as political analysis’ (1999, p. 23). Brown argues that this **pervasive** structure of **left-wing melancholy**, despite being based on an ostensible commitment to radical transformation, in fact **engenders a conservative refusal to engage critically** and constructively with the world. Instead, the left-wing melancholic takes refuge in his or her **attachments to a lost ideal of traditional left theory and politics**. The crucial point for Brown is that the problems affecting the academic left do not – as the left-wing melancholic would have it – arise from the left’s abandonment of its radical principles. Rather, this melancholia arises from many leftists’ continued (often unacknowledged) attachments to a historically specific model of anti-capitalist revolutionary social change, whose privileged status is now called into question. Left-wing melancholia, for Brown, is therefore **bound up with a generalised refusal** or inability to respond to the challenges engendered by the changing nature of capitalism, and the emergence of various forms of radical politics – feminism, queer politics, anti-racism and so on – irreducible to historical materialist models of political transformation.3 Brown’s text is notable for its lack of proper names, and as such melancholia is implicitly understood to refer to a collective, widely shared set of investments and orientations. This aspect of left melancholia is tackled in some detail in J.K. Gibson-Graham’s (2006) analysis of the affects and emotions of the academic left. One of Gibson-Graham’s central aims is to contest an entrenched mindset in which ‘the accepted or correct ‘political’ stance is one in which the emotional and affective dispositions of paranoia, melancholia, and moralism intermingle and self-reinforce’ (2006, p. 4). Crucially, these negative affects are not located in particular individuals, but are a ‘structure of feeling’ (2006, p. 1) ‘widely present if not fully manifest in any person or pronouncement’ (2006, p. 6). Gibson-Graham suggests that these structures of feeling reduce the academic left to **political [clogging]** ~~paralysis~~, and also curtail our analytical capacities: left melancholia, they argue, reflects and reinforces rather **crude, totalising renditions of capitalism** as a pervasive and largely uncontestable socio-economic formation. Consequently, complexities within capitalism, and socio-economic practices that diverge from – or indeed actively resist – capitalism, are downplayed, overlooked and cast to the margins, precluding the production of more nuanced framings of contemporary economic practices and social formations. The thrust of Brown and Gibson-Graham’s critical analyses of various aspects of left melancholia is not to suggest that those on the academic left should simply cheer up, or foster more positive affective orientations for the sake of it. Rather, their point is that melancholia – conceived as a specific kind of psychic formation different to, say, disappointment or sadness – **hampers the academic left’s ability** to intervene politically, or to engage in fruitful socio-political analysis. Consequently, Gibson-Graham and others make a persuasive argument that **an urgent task** for the left is to explore how we might weaken the hold of melancholia.

**This articulates itself in ways that are racist, sexist, and destroy alt solvency**

**Ross 2k** [Marlon B., Professor, Department of English and Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies, “Commentary: Pleasuring Identity, or the Delicious Politics of Belonging,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 4, pages 840-841]

Although in his contribution Eric Lott targets Professor Michaels's comments and his own recent feud with Timothy Brennan (who unfortunately is not included in this volume) rather than Ken's argument, what Eric says about “left and liberal fundamentalists” who “simply and somewhat penitently” urge us to “‘go back to class’” could also be directed at Ken's conclusion. Ken writes, “Crafting a political left that does not merely reflect existing racial divisions starts with the relatively mundane proposition that it is possible to make a persuasive appeal to the given interests of working and unemployed women and men, regardless of race, in support of a program for economic justice.” On this one, I side with Eric, rather than Tim and Ken. Standing on the left depends on whose left side we're talking about. My left might be your right and vice versa, because it depends on what direction we're facing, and what direction depends on which identities we're assuming and affirming. Eric adds, "Even in less dismissive [than Tim's] accounts of new social movements based not on class but on identities formed by histories of injustice, there is a striking a priori sense of voluntarism about the investment in this cause or that movement or the other issue—as though determining the most fundamental issue were a matter of the writer's strength of feeling rather than a studied or analytical sense of the ever-unstable balance of forces in a hegemonic bloc at a given moment." I agree, but I'll risk mangling what Eric says by putting it more crassly.Touting class **or "economic justice"**as the fundamental stance for left identity is just another way of telling everybody else to shut up so I can be heard above the fray. Because of the force of "identity politics," a leftist white person would be leery of claiming to lead Blacks toward the promised land, a leftist straight man leery of claiming to lead women or queers, but, for a number of complex rationalizations, we in the middle class (where all of us writing here currently reside) still have few qualms about volunteering to lead, at least theoretically, the working class toward "economic justice." What Eric calls here "left fundamentalism," I'd call, at the risk of sounding harsh, left paternalism. **Of the big identity groups articulated through "identity politics," economic class remains the only identity where a straight white middle-class man can still feel comfortable claiming himself a leading political voice, and thus hemay sometimes overcompensate by screaming that this is the only identity that really matters—which is the same as claiming that class is beyond identity**. Partly this is because**Marxist theory**and Marx himself (a bourgeois intellectual creating the theoretical practice for the workers' revolution) **stage the model for working-class identity as a sort of trans-identification, a magical identity that is transferable to those outside the group who commit themselves to it wholeheartedly enough**. If we look back, we realize even this magical quality is not special to a history of class struggle, as whites during the New Negro movements of the early twentieth century felt that they were vanguard race leaders because they had putatively imbibed some essential qualities of Negroness by cross-identifying with the folk and their culture.

**Cap Good**

**Markets solve sustainability and are the only way to solve warming**

**Adler 22,** Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Coleman Burke Center for Environmental Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law; "How Markets Make Economic Growth Sustainable," Reason, 3-30-2022, https://reason.com/volokh/2022/03/30/how-markets-make-economic-growth-sustainable/, Accessed 7-4-2022, LASA-SC

Fifty years ago, researchers at MIT produced The Limits to Growth, a report on how existing economic trends foretold environmental ruin. Left unchecked, the authors predicted, **expanding** populations and economic **growth** would exhaust global resources and ultimately prompt **civilizational collapse**. The models upon which Limits was based suggested that global reserves of copper, silver, lead, tin, zinc, and petroleum would have all run out by now, and the world would be struggling to find enough arable land to feed a population of over 7 billion people. Without governmental efforts to change global trends, "[t]he most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity," the authors warned. As should be obvious, the predictions offered in The Limits to Growth (and other contemporary doomsayers) were **wildly off the mark**. Among other things, they failed to account for how **markets respond to scarcity**, producing incentives for **efficiency and innovation**, so that we may do more with less. In short, the authors failed to understand why markets encourage sustainability. Those predicting imminent depletion of global resources and exhaustion of the earth's carrying capacity also failed to predict what is arguably the most important -- and under-appreciated -- **positive** environmental trend of the 21st century: **Dematerialization** of modern economies. The same **economic incentives** which forestalled resource exhaustion have actually enabled people to do more with less throughout the developed world. This dramatic development is chronicled in Andrew McAfee's book, More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources — and What Happens Next, which I reviewed for Regulation. Here is an excerpt from my review: **Dematerialization** may be the **most important**, yet unsung, example of environmental progress in the 21st century. It is commonplace to observe that the relentless drive to do more with less has led to more efficient resource use, so that a soda can today is made with a fraction of the metal required 50 years ago. But dematerialization is not merely a story about increased efficiency or per‐​capita reductions. What is now being observed represents a **fundamental decoupling** of resource consumption from economic growth, such that as mature economies grow, they not only use **fewer resources** per unit of output, but they also **consume fewer resources overall.** In short, economic growth in the most developed nations increasingly coincides with a net reduction in resource consumption. Let that sink in. It is not merely that we are using resources more efficiently in countries like the United States. It's also that we are actually using fewer total resources year-over-year. The United States uses less **gold, steel, aluminum, copper, stone, cement,** and even **paper** than it did at the start of this century, despite the continued increase in gross domestic product. Annual consumption of all but six of the **72 resources** tracked by the U.S. Geological Service are "**post peak**." We also use less **fertilizer and water** while growing more crops. Plastic consumption is up, as is energy use, but these two appear to have been **decoupled** from population and economic growth as well. How does this dematerialization occur? Some examples may be useful. The dematerialization of soda cans is relatively easy to grasp, particularly for those of us who can remember the heavier cans of the 20th century. Aluminum cans weighed 85 grams when introduced in the 1950s. By 2011, the average can was under 13 grams. Cans today are not only thinner and lighter, they are produced more efficiently, with fewer separate sheets of metal. **Substitution** can be an even more powerful source of dematerialization. Consider telecommunications. A single fiber optic cable made from less than 150 pounds of silica can carry the same volume of information as multiple 1‑ton copper cables. And were that not enough, satellite and wireless technologies enable us to bypass the use of physical cables altogether. We can communicate more and yet use vastly less material to do so. This not only saves copper, but other resources too. Think of all the paper saved by **e**‑**mail, e‑banking, and e‑readers.** Not only did neo-Malthusians **not predict** these developments, they failed to recognize that such trends would be **driven by private markets**, and not governmental regulation. We do more with less not because of government regulation or administrative direction, but because of **capitalism** and **technology**. These are the dominant forces driving dematerialization in the most developed countries and they could unleash similar gains in the **rest of the world**. We "want more all the time, but not more resources," McAfee notes. We want more of what resources can provide, and one way to get more is to do more with less. Market capitalism both facilitates and enhances the underlying incentives that **drive efficiency gains** and technological advance. This not only leads to dematerialization but also promotes "critical aspects of well‐​being," including health and prosperity. Unfortunately, these trends are not universal. While we consume fewer resources in developed nations, these trends have not (yet) taken hold in many developing countries, which often lack well-functioning market economies. We have also not observed equivalent trends in many forms of pollution, largely because emissions are not priced the way consumption is. An entrepreneur who figures out how to produce widgets while using less copper gains an economic advantage, as the copper must be paid for. An entrepreneur who figures out how to emit fewer particulates or nitrogen oxides does not, as emitting such pollutants is not meaningfully priced and contemporary regulations rarely create meaningful incentives for emission reductions on the margin. Understanding **what** has encouraged and allowed for dematerialization at the same time that populations have expanded and economies have grown is essential if these trends are to be **replicated** in developing countries and if we are to **meet contemporary environmental challenges**, including **climate change**. A suite of policies designed to replicate the same market dynamics that have led dematerialization could spur **meaningful decarbonization**. Ill-conceived policies, on the other hand, could actually do more harm than good. This is but one more reason policymakers should be more interested in fiscal instruments than regulatory mandates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Another article in the same issue of Regulation as my More from Less review notes that greenhouse gas emissions in the United States may have **peaked** in 2005, and that GHG emissions appear to **initially increase**, but then **decline**, with economic growth. Such trends are not observed, however, in less-developed and less-market-oriented economies, such as China. The authors, Bruce Yandle and Jody Lipford, think this indicates that domestic GHGs could **continue to decline** going forward, **even** **without** **new** government **policies**. This may be so, but the reductions are nowhere near what would be achieved if carbon emissions were priced and there were more powerful market incentives for market decarbonization. Greater **market incentives** for decarbonization could also lead to the development and **deployment of low-carbon technologies** that could facilitate **emission reductions** in other countries as well, and given that climate change is a global concern, such measures will be necessary if atmospheric stabilization is to be achieved. The bottom line is that competitive markets create **powerful incentives** for efficient and sustainable resource use. Market-driven innovation has made it possible to provide for more people using fewer resources. Such environmental successes are often ignored because there is no policymaker or program than can take credit for them. They are the result of market processes, **not governmental direction or design.**

**Capitalism causes dematerialization which solves sustainability questions**

**Zitelmann 21** – studied history and political sciences, graduating with a doctorate “summa cum laude” in 1986. His dissertation was published in both German and English: Hitler. The Policies of Seduction. Rainer Zitelmann began his career lecturing history at the Freie Universität Berlin from 1987 to 1992. He then became chief editor at one of the leading and most prestigious publishing houses in Germany, Ullstein-Propyläen. He followed this with the role of section editor at the major German daily newspaper “Die Welt”, which he held until 2000. (Rainer, "Consumption Presumption: Are Human Beings Destroying the World?," National Interest, 2-12-2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/consumption-presumption-are-human-beings-destroying-world-178114, Accessed 7-4-2022, LASA-SC)

Some people claim that we need to cut our consumption or there will be no hope for the planet. Such claims are based on the thesis that continued growth increases the rate at which the earth’s finite resources are consumed and, moreover, leads to irreversible climate change. And **such warnings are by no means new.** In 1970, for instance, the Club of Rome attracted a great deal of attention with the publication of The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, which has to date sold more than thirty million copies in thirty languages. The book warned people to change their ways and had a clear message: the world’s raw materials, and in particular, oil would soon be used up. In twenty years, the scientists predicted, we would have used the very last drop of oil. Of course, the Club of Rome’s models for the depletion of oil—and almost all other major raw materials—were wrong. According to the scenarios presented in The Limits to Growth, we should now be living on a planet that has been devoid of natural gas, copper, lead, aluminum and tungsten for decades. And **we were supposed to have run out of silver in 1985.** Despite the bleak forecasts, as of January 2020, the United States Geological Survey estimated silver reserves worldwide at 560,000 tons. Employing an extensive array of data, the American scientist Andrew McAfee proves in his book More from Less that **economic growth is no longer coupled to the consumption of raw materials.** Data for the United States, for example, show that of seventy-two resources, from aluminum to zinc, **only six are not yet post-peak.** Nevertheless, despite the fact that the U.S. economy has grown strongly in recent years, **consumption of many commodities is actually decreasing**. Back in 2015, the American environmental scientist Jesse Ausubel wrote an essay, “The Return of Nature: How Technology Liberates the Environment,” showing that Americans are consuming fewer and fewer raw materials per capita. Total consumption of steel, copper, fertilizer, wood and paper, which had previously always risen in line with economic growth, **had plateaued and was now in constant decline**. Such across-the-board reductions in natural resource consumption are only possible because of much-maligned capitalism: companies are constantly developing more efficient production methods and reducing the amount of raw materials they consume. Of course, **they are** not **doing this** primarily to protect the environment but **to cut costs**. What's more, a constant stream of innovations has promoted the trend of miniaturization or dematerialization. Just think of your smartphone. How many devices has your smartphone replaced and how many raw materials did they use to consume? Nowadays, many people no longer have a fax machine or street atlas because they have everything they need on their smartphone. Some even use their phones instead of a wristwatch. You used to need four separate microphones in your telephone, cassette recorder, Dictaphone and video camera, today you just need one—in your smartphone. The finite nature of the world’s natural resources is one argument against growth, **climate change is another**. Let’s take China as an example: China currently emits more CO2 than any other country in the world and is **building** a number of **new nuclear power plants in order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060**. With the new build program well underway, China’s first new-generation nuclear power plant recently went into operation. In the very near future, China intends to start exporting power plants. The latest generation of nuclear power plants is much safer than earlier models—and can play a pivotal role in the fight against climate change. In the United States, Joe Biden is already evaluating the advantages of small modular reactor (SMR) **nuclear power plants**. As the name suggests, SMRs are smaller than traditional nuclear fission reactors and offer a maximum capacity of three hundred megawatts. In the United Kingdom, for example, a consortium led by Rolls-Royce has announced plans to build up to sixteen SMR power plants. So far, two reactors of this type are in operation, both onboard the floating nuclear power plant “Akademik Lomonosov, which supplies heat and electricity to the Siberian city of Pevec and its one hundred thousand inhabitants. Anticapitalists blame capitalism for resource consumption and climate change. But political decisions—such as Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy—frequently **have a negative impact on climate change**. Telling people to cut their consumption must seem like pure mockery to the hundreds of millions of people around the world who are still living in extreme poverty. **What they need is** more capitalism and **economic growth.** Just like in China, where the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 percent in 1981 to less than 1 percent today. Andrew McAfee’s book has an optimistic message about how we don't have to turn back the clocks and cut our consumption: capitalism and technological progress are allowing us to steward the world’s resources, rather than stripping them bare.

**Privatization is necessary for space colonization – disruptions kill that potential**

**Thiessen ‘20** – writes a twice-weekly column for The Post on foreign and domestic policy. He is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the former chief speechwriter for President George W. Bush. (Marc A., "SpaceX’s success is one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism," Washington Post, 6-1-2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/01/spacexs-success-is-one-small-step-man-one-giant-leap-capitalism/, Accessed 7-4-2022, LASA-SC)

It was one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism. Only three countries have ever launched human beings into orbit. This past weekend, **SpaceX became the first private company ever to do so**, when it sent its Crew Dragon capsule into space aboard its Falcon 9 rocket and docked with the International Space Station. This was accomplished by a company Elon Musk started in 2002 in a California strip mall warehouse with just a dozen employees and a mariachi band. At a time when our nation is debating the merits of socialism, **SpaceX has given us an incredible testament to the power of American free enterprise.** While the left is advocating unprecedented government intervention in almost every sector of the U.S. economy, from health care to energy, today Americans are celebrating the successful privatization of space travel. If you want to see the difference between what government and private enterprise can do, consider: **It took a private company to give us the first space vehicle with touch-screen controls instead of antiquated knobs and buttons. It took a private company to give us a capsule that can fly entirely autonomously from launch to landing — including docking — without any participation by its human crew. It also took a private company to invent a reusable rocket that can not only take off but land as well.** When the Apollo 11 crew reached the moon on July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong declared “the Eagle has landed.” On Saturday, SpaceX was able to declare that the Falcon had landed when its rocket settled down on a barge in the Atlantic Ocean — ready to be used again. That last development will save the taxpayers incredible amounts of money. The cost to NASA for launching a man into space on the space shuttle orbiter was $170 million per seat, compared with just $60 million to $67 million on the Dragon capsule. The cost for the space shuttle to send a kilogram of cargo into to space was $54,500; with the Falcon rocket, the cost is just $2,720 — a decrease of 95 percent. And while the space shuttle cost $27.4 billion to develop, the Crew Dragon was designed and built for just $1.7 billion — making it the lowest-cost spacecraft developed in six decades. SpaceX did it in six years — far faster than the time it took to develop the space shuttle. The private sector does it better, cheaper, faster and more efficiently than government. Why? **Competition.** Today, SpaceX has to compete with a constellation of private companies — including legacy aerospace firms such as Orbital ATK and United Launch Alliance and innovative start-ups such as Blue Origin (which is designing a Mars lander and whose owner, Jeff Bezos, also owns The Post) and Virgin Orbit (which is developing rockets than can launch satellites into space from the underside of a 747, avoiding the kinds of weather that delayed the Dragon launch). In the race to put the first privately launched man into orbit, upstart SpaceX had to beat aerospace behemoth Boeing and its Starliner capsule to the punch. It did so — for more than $1 billion less than its competitor. **That spirit of competition and innovation will revolutionize space travel in the years ahead**. Indeed, Musk has his sights set far beyond Earth orbit. Already, SpaceX is working on a much larger version of the Falcon 9 reusable rocket called Super Heavy that will carry a deep-space capsule named Starship capable of carrying up to 100 people to the moon and eventually to Mars. Musk’s goal — the reason he founded SpaceX — is to **colonize Mars and make humanity a multiplanetary species**. He has set a goal of founding a million-person city on Mars by 2050 complete with iron foundries and pizza joints. Can it be done? Who knows. But this much is certain: **Private-sector innovation is opening the door to a new era of space exploration.** Wouldn’t it be ironic if, just as capitalism is allowing us to explore the farthest reaches of our solar system, Americans decided to embrace socialism back here on Earth?

**Space col is possible.**

**Mack '20** – Contributing editor Eric Mack covers space, science, climate change and all things futuristic. (Eric, "It's time we talked about how we could actually live on Mars, and maybe even survive there," CNET, 3-7-2020, https://www.cnet.com/features/the-terrifying-reality-of-actually-living-on-mars/, Accessed 7-4-2022, LASA-SC)

Elon Musk hopes to have a metropolis a million earthlings strong on Mars by mid-century, complete with everything from factories to breweries. **But** before anyone can swill down a Martian IPA, **we'll first have to deal with the myriad ways the red planet can kill a person.** If you were teleported to Mars with just basic camping gear, you'd eventually die of radiation poisoning or cancer. But you'd freeze to death long before then, most likely on the first night when temperatures dip to Antarctic levels. Before that, you'd suffocate trying to breathe the atmosphere made up of mostly carbon dioxide. But before even that, the very low atmospheric pressure on Mars would cause your blood to literally boil, regardless of the outside temperature. In short, **camping out there will require much more than pitching a tent.** Fortunately for aspiring Martians, **humans have spent a lot of time thinking about how to live on a relatively inhospitable planet millions of miles away from Earth**. Ideas have ranged from big bubble cities to underground bases -- one of NASA's latest concepts even involves Martian homes made of fungi. While Mars may be preferable to closer options like Venus with its boiling heat and toxic atmosphere, or the moon with zero atmosphere and space stations lacking gravity, it's still a problematic environment. "You would fizz to death," the SETI Institute's Pascal Lee explains in the video below. On Earth we never worry about going full soda, thanks to our very friendly atmosphere and helpful magnetic field. But **on Mars we'll need to create infrastructure to solve the problems our planet handles automatically.** And of course, we also have to develop ways to extract the water and oxygen we need to survive from a Martian landscape that has hidden them away in pockets of ice, soil, rock and extremely thin air. **Easy peasy.** However, Lee and others who have cataloged the many ways to die on Mars do not see them as insurmountable hurdles. In fact, there might be **one ready-made solution for living on Mars that's viable from the moment humans arrive for the very first time.** Just stay on the ship. Living in the parking lot This futuristic render shows a collection of Starships hanging out on the surface of Mars. Elon Musk and Space envision astronauts initially living out of the spaceships **while constructing a more permanent human settlement** on the Red Planet. SpaceX The first people to arrive via a SpaceX Starship will likely live and work out of the landed spacecraft in the beginning. **"[Starships]** are very valuable on the surface of Mars," said Paul Wooster, the company's principal Mars development engineer, in 2018 at a Mars Society convention. "You'd actually be having most of the ships stay and you'd be operating using the various systems on them to support the activities there." Living in the ship after arrival isn't just a SpaceX idea, though. The Mars Society, founded in 1998 to advocate for exploring and setting up a human presence on Mars, has its own "Mars Direct" plan. It also suggests traveling to Mars in habitats or "habs" that could then be used to set up a base on the surface once the earthlings arrive. The habs could be connected together, in much the same way that modular buildings are trucked around on Earth and quickly hooked together on site. "**We could have people on Mars by 2030 and a permanent manned base by 2040**," Zubrin told me in 2018. Besides bringing their own shelter to start, Martian pioneers must also pack the right tools to harvest materials from the rugged landscape in order to build a more permanent crib. "Very little that pertains to living on Mars in the early years will involve off-the-shelf equipment and supplies from Earth," writes Stephen Petranek in his book How We'll Live on Mars. "Almost every tool or device in use on Mars will need to have been carefully thought out." Building from scratch For the long term, a basic modular camp like the one Matt Damon struggles with in 2015's The Martian may not offer sufficient protection from radiation and other dangers, especially in the case of a powerful solar flare aimed directly at Mars. **Radiation shielding doesn't need to be high-tech**. A barrier made up of water or certain plastics can work, as can simply going underground. Former NASA physician Jim Logan estimates putting our fragile, fleshy bodies behind or beneath about **9 feet (2.7 meters) of Martian soil should suffice**. Zubrin has also suggested using thick bricks made from Martian regolith to construct shelter, adding a uniquely medieval castle vibe to the more traditionally sleek and futuristic vision of a Mars outpost. Old lava tubes and underground caves are also ideal places to shelter, both early on and in the case of emergencies like major dust and solar storms that can sometimes spread across the entire planet. In the absence of other options, **3D printing technology offers another alternative for creating custom structures**. NASA held a 3D printed habitat challenge in 2019, with New York's AI SpaceFactory (which bills itself as a "multi-planetary architectural and technology design agency") winning the top prize for a system that built a lightweight but strong structure using autonomous robots requiring almost no human guidance. Going underground or behind thick walls isn't exactly great for the agriculture that's going to be essential to sustain any presence on Mars, however. Mechanical engineer Andrew Geiszler suggested at the 2015 Mars Society convention that **geodesic glass domes could be the answer**. Mars provides all the raw materials needed to create glass, plastic and metals that can then be turned into dome homes. "**Ultimately we're going to need to use native materials. It's very feasible. They're there for the taking**." The glass dome structure has been popular in visions of Mars settlements going back decades, including in some recent renderings from HP's Mars Home Planet concept challenge that asked designers to draw up plans for a city on Mars. This leaves the question of exactly where on Mars is best to establish a presence. None of the above is possible without access to water, which we need to create oxygen, grow food and produce fuel and other raw materials. So finding precious H2O will be a top priority along with shelter from the elements when choosing a site. Water has been found in Martian soil, in trace amounts in the air, and in significant amounts near and below ice deposits. Moving to the edge of a Martian ice cap would likely be too cold and windy, but the planet also offers intriguing craters and canyons that provide a certain amount of shelter, building materials and water from deposits of ice or possibly even springs. The remarkable Valles Marineris, a massive gorge eight times longer and four times deeper than the Grand Canyon, is one place often suggested as a dramatic second home for hardy humans. **Time to Terraform** Maintaining all of the necessary life support systems on Mars will be quite an undertaking, which is why Musk and others have a long, long term vision of expanding the habitable bubble we construct on Mars to eventually encompass the entire planet. **The concept is often referred to as terraforming**, and would involve changing the planet's environment to be more earth-like. Musk notably proposed nuking Mars' poles to release massive amounts of greenhouse gases to warm the planet, although he's also amenable to massive solar mirrors.